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I. INTRODUCTION
Numerous forms of non-state actor conduct in violation of treaty-
based and customary international law have been subject to criminal and
civil sanctions in various international and domestic fora for centuries.
Within United States domestic legal processes, early types of non-state
actor violations included, among others, piracy, war crimes, the
counterfeiting of foreign currency, violation of passports, the slave trade,
breaches of neutrality, violations of territorial rights, other acts of hostility,
violence against foreign officials, general trespasses against the law of
nations, conduct of poisoners and assassins, and violations of human
rights.2 Thus, statements that private actor liability did not begin until the
twentieth century or that private actor liability with respect to human rights
did not begin until after World War II would be in serious error. More
recently, the landmark case of Kadic v. Karadzic' provides continued
recognition of private actor liability for, among others, piracy, slave trade,
passport violations, breaches of neutrality, hijacking of aircraft, crimes
against humanity, genocide, and war crimes.4 The United States Executive
1. Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston. Director of the International Law
Institute, Houston Law Center. These remarks were presented at the International Law
Association ILA Weekend, October 2001, New York, New York, United States.
2. See, e.g., United States v. Haun, 26 F. Cas. 227, 231 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1860) (No.
15,329) (Campbell, J., on circuit) (private human rights duties); JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 8, 15-17, 23-24, 120-32 passim (2000);
JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATEs 7-8, 34 n.38, 48-49
ns.60-80, 50 n.88, 182, 201-03, 205, 264-70, 274-76, 289-91 passim (1996).
3. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996).
4. See id. at 236, 239-43(2d Cir. 1995).
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branch has also recognized on numerous occasions that private actors,
including private companies, can violate international law, including
human rights law, especially when non-state actors have been prosecuted
by the government for violations of international law.,
I. PROSECUTION OF AND LAWSUITS AGAINST BIN LADEN ETAL.
In view of such trends and recognitions, it should not be surprising
that Mr. bin Laden and his entourage, if reasonably accused, as well as the
companies or corporations they control or that are complicit in their illegal
schemes, as private actors, are subject to criminal and civil sanctions in the
United States for violations of international law. For example, if
captured, 6 prosecution of Mr. bin Laden and others acting outside the
United States in connection with the September 1 lth terroristic attack on
the United States and on United States nationals is possible under the
United States Antiterrorism Act. 7  Section 2332(a) of the Act is not
applicable to homicide as such arising from the attacks because although
the section applies to "Whoever kills a national of the United States" it
adds the limiting phrase "while such national is outside the United States."
Yet, such language would cover prosecution of homicide against United
States nationals abroad in the case of the bombings of United States
5. See, e.g., Klinghoffer v. S.N. C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991) ("both
the Executive and Legislative Branches have expressly endorsed the concept of suing terrorist
organizations in federal court"-there, liability for unlawful killing); Haun, 26 F. Cas. at 231
(President Jefferson's recognition in an address to Congress of "violations of human rights" by
private "citizens of the United States"); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 252-53 (1907) (U.S. dredging
company is liable for harm caused by dredging activity); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 68, 69 (1797); 1 Op.
Att'y Gen. 61, 62 (1796); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795); Jordan J. Paust, On Human Rights:
The Use of Human Right Precepts in U.S. History and the Right to an Effective Remedy in
Domestic Courts, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 543, 617-18 (also quoting Memorandum for the United
States as Amicus Curiae in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 at 621 (human rights under
international law "'directly create rights and duties of private individuals . .. ' do create such
rights and duties," (quoting the "highly respected" Constitutional Court of Germany)), 623-24
n.502 (quoting President Washington and E. MCDOWELL, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES
PRACTICE, Supra, at 171), 630-31 (1989), revised in PAUST, supra note 1, at 199-201, 204-05,
269 n.504.
6. I assume that capture of Mr. bin Laden or others in Afghanistan would be permissible
under international law either as lawful acts undertaken during a process of self-defense under
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter or as lawful acts undertaken during a U.N. Security Council
authorized use of armed force under S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1373 (2001), which reaffirmed "the need to combat by all means... threats to international
peace and security caused by terrorist acts," id. at pmbl., and called upon all states "to prevent
terrorist attacks and take action against perpetrators of such acts," id. at 3(c)). Concurring in
the general propriety of arrests in foreign states in such circumstances, see, e.g., PAUST, ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 479.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 et seq.
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Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the attack on the U.S.S. Cole.
Section 2332 (b) does not contain the limiting phrase noted above
regarding the location of United States victims and can cover attempts and
conspiracy in connection with the killing of a national of the United States
(apparently anywhere) although the accused must be "outside the United
States" at the time of the attempt or the engagement in a conspiracy to kill.
Section 2332(c) should also be applicable, since it reaches an accused
"outside the United States" who "engages in physical violence-(1) with
intent to cause serious bodily injury to a national of the United States; or
(2) with the result that serious bodily injury is caused to a national of the
United States." Section 2332(d) requires written certification by the
United States Attorney General "or the highest ranking subordinate" that
offenses under Section 2332 were "intended to coerce, intimidate, or
retaliate against a government or a civilian population"-a certification that
would be relatively easy to make.
Section 2332(b) applies to "acts of terrorism transcending national
boundaries" and can form the basis for prosecution, for example, of any
person who kills, maims, or assaults (if the latter results in serious bodily
injury) any person within the United States or "creates a substantial risk of
serious bodily injury to any other person by destroying or damaging any
structure . . . or other real or personal property within the United States..
" if such involves "conduct transcending national boundaries" and one of
the circumstances listed in subsection (b) is present. Relevant
circumstances in subsection (b) could include:
(A) the mail or any facility of interstate or foreign commerce is used
in furtherance of the offense;
(B) the offense obstructs, delays, or affects interstate or foreign
commerce, or would have so obstructed, delayed, or affected interstate or
foreign commerce if the offense had been consummated;
(C) the victim, or intended victim, is the United States Government, a
member of the uniformed services, or any official, officer, employee, or
agent of the legislative, executive, or judicial branches, or of any
department or agency, of the United States;
(D) the structure, conveyance, or other real or personal property is, in
whole or in part, owned, possessed, or leased to the United States, or any
department or agency of the United States.
The listed circumstances would be met if Mr. bin Laden used any
facility of foreign commerce to plan, finance, order, or carry out the
September 11 th attack; if the targeting of the World Trade Center affected
interstate or foreign commerce; if the United States Government and
Pentagon personnel were victims; and/or if the Pentagon was targeted.
Prosecution of non-state and state actors is also possible under United
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States legislation implementing the Montreal Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (which
in Article 7 thereof also requires all signatories to bring into custody those
reasonably accused of international crimes covered by the treaty and either
to initiate prosecution of or to extradite such persons, without any
exception or limitation of such duty whatsoever). 18 U.S.C. § 32(a)
should be applicable to "[wihoever willfully-(1) . . . destroys, disables,
or wrecks, any aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United
States" and to whoever "(5) performs an act of violence against or
incapacitates any individual on any such aircraft . . . " and such persons
should include any co-conspirators who were involved in the willful
destruction of United States commercial aircraft flying within United States
airspace.
Since international terrorism9 and crimes against humanity' are
international crimes over which there is universal jurisdiction and a
universal responsibility either to initiate prosecution of or to extradite those
reasonably accused," the United States should also be able to enact new
legislation that operates retroactively for prosecution of what were already
recognizable international crimes under customary international law, and
such legislation should not be challengeable under prohibitions of ex post
facto laws. The permissibility of such retroactive legislation was affirmed,
for example, in the Eichmann case in Israel'2 (also addressing similar
rulings in the Netherlands and Germany); in the United States extradition
decision in Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky;'3 and by the Executive officials
applying the 1863 Lieber Code to acts that were already war crimes under
customary international law. 4  Certain persons accused of international
crimes before the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and for
the Far East made claims that Charters of the Tribunals incorporating such
crimes were violative of ex post facto or nullum crimen sine lege precepts,
8. Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 21, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
9. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001);
S.C. Res. 579, U.N. SCOR, 2637th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/579 (1985); G.A. Res. 40/61,
U.N. GAOR, 108th mtg., Supp. No. 53 at 301, U.N. Doc. AIRES/40/61 (1986); JORDAN J.
PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 995, 1005, 1007 (2d ed. 2000).
10. See, e.g., PAUST ET AL., supra note 9, at 855-916.
11. See, e.g., id. at9, 16-17, 132-35, 140-41.
12. Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, reprinted in PAUST ET. AL., supra note 2, at
455.
13. 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985).
14. See, e.g., DIGEST OF OPS. OF JAG, ARMY 244 (1866); PAUST ET. AL., supra note 9,
at 244-48.
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but the Tribunals correctly ruled that the crimes existed under international
law at the time of their commission and that no such precepts were
violated. 15 Similarly, a new International Criminal Tribunal could be
created by Executive Agreement to prosecute international crimes arising
out of the September 11 th attack.
Civil lawsuits are also possible against non-state persons or
corporations under the Antiterrorism Act, assuming that Mr. bin Laden or
other persons outside the United States are captured and brought to the
United States and process has been served. Section 2333 allows civil
remedies in a lawsuit brought by "[a]ny national of the United States
injured in his or her person, property, or business, by reason of an act of
international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs . . . and
[such plaintiff] shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and
the cost of the suit, including attorney's fees." The main problem after
winning such a lawsuit will involve execution of a judgment on any
properties of the defendants located within the United States (no real
problem) or execution abroad (at the discretion of some foreign court).
Perhaps bank accounts of Mr. bin Laden, his entourage, and companies
involved in terrorism could be frozen not merely for purposes of
preventing the financing of terrorism, but also for recompense and other
types of damages for victims.
Foreign plaintiffs can also sue non-state persons or corporations under
the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)' 6 for any wrong in violation of
customary international law and/or treaties of the United States, such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights'7 or the Montreal
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation. 8 Punitive damages are recoverable in such lawsuits.
Under the ATCA, plaintiffs could sue any companies or corporations
complicit in relevant violations of international law, e.g., companies or
corporations used to finance terroristic attacks in violation of human rights.
Whether lawsuits by United States or foreign plaintiffs are possible under
the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA)19 depends on interpretation of
phrases such as "extrajudicial killing" and on whether Mr. bin Laden and
15. See, e.g., PAUSTETAL., supra note 9, at 625, 628-29.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
17. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 9, 1966, art. 6, 7, 9, 974
U.N.T.S. 171 (in particular, plaintiffs should stress violations of the right to life (art. 6), cruel
and inhumane treatment (art. 7), and liberty and security of person (art. 9). Concerning human
rights duties of non-state actors, see, e.g. supra note 1 and infra notes 26-31, 33-40.).
18. Montreal Convention, supra note 8.
19. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 1992.
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his entourage were acting "under actual or apparent authority, or color of
law, of any foreign nation" (such as Iraq or Afghanistan). Of course, Mr.
bin Laden is not a leader of any foreign nation, state, belligerency, or
insurgency within the meaning of international law and is merely a private
actor. However, under certain circumstances, private actors can be acting
under actual or "apparent authority" or "color" within the meaning of the
TVPA.2 Appropriate tests recognized in Kadic include inquiry whether
the non-state actor acts "together with" a state, "in concert with" a state,
or with "significant state aid"; 21 and tests recognized in Iwanowa v. Ford
Motor Company2 include whether the non-state actor acts "in close
cooperation with" or has "worked closely with" a state.2
If relevant acts were committed by Mr. bin Laden and his entourage
without direct participation in any armed conflict, the acts would not be
war crimes. However, if they were committed in direct connection with
an armed conflict-e.g., as an extension of the armed conflict between Iraq
and the United States and other countries in the ongoing Gulf War or as an
extension out of the insurgency that was occurring prior to September 1 1th
in Afghanistan between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance-
prosecution is possible under 10 U.S.C. §§ 818 and 821, as supplemented
for purposes of jurisdiction in the federal courts by 18 U.S.C. § 3231,21
whether or not other war crimes legislation is available alternatively.
When "grave breaches" of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (including
"willful killing, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body
or health . . . " to persons protected by the Conventions) have been
committed by any person "inside or outside the United States" against a
United States national, the War Crimes Act of 1996 is operative.,,
Mr. bin Laden and others are also under indictment for various other
crimes in connection with the first bombing of the World Trade Center,
including conspiracy to murder United States nationals, to use weapons of
mass destruction against United States nationals, to destroy United States
buildings and property, and to destroy United States defense utilities. 26
20. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 244-45.
21. Id. at 245.
22. 67 F. Supp.2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999).
23. Id. at 445-46 and n.27.
24. See, e.g., PAUST ET. AL., supra note 9, at 243-44, 253-59; Jordan J. Paust, The Case
for War Crime Jurisdiction Over Civilians in Federal District Courts, 50 TEX. L. REV. 6 (1971).
25. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2401 (1996).
26. See United States v. Usama bin Laden, et al., 92 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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III. PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITY OF COMPANIES AND CORPORATIONS
MORE GENERALLY
With respect to corporate liability for violations of international law,
it should be noted that a private company or corporation as such is simply
a juridic person and has no immunity under domestic United States or
international law. In each nation-state, private corporations, like private
individuals, are bound by domestic laws .21 Similarly, private corporations
and entities are bound by international laws applicable to individuals. For
example, in the United States and elsewhere, companies and other non-
state associations and organizations have been found to have civil and
criminal responsibility for various violations of international law, including
human rights and related international proscriptions.2 Further, the
27. This widespread pattern of legal responsibility and nonimmunity of private
corporations under domestic law is itself a general principle of law relevant to international legal
decisionmaking. Concerning the relevance of general principles of law, see, e.g., Statute of the
International Court of Justice, art. 38 (1) (c).
28. See, e.g., cases infra notes 28-41; Weisshaus v. Swiss Bankers Ass'n (in re Holocaust
Victim Assets Litigation), 225 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2000) (participation of Swiss banks in war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide); Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332, 336-37
(1 lth Cir. 1992) (the Contras can be civilly liable for torture and unlawful killing); Klinghoffer v.
S.N. C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991) (the PLO and various organizations can be
civilly liable for murder); 739 F. Supp. 854, 858, 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re Nazi Era Cases
Against German Defendants Litigation, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis No. 18148 (D.N.J. Dec. 5, 2000);
In re Holocaust Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp.2d 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); In re Austrian and
German Bank Holocaust Litigation, 80 F. Supp.2d 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Doe I v. Islamic
Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. 3, 8 (D.D.C. 1998); PAUST ET AL., supra note 2, at 16, 106-107
(Japanese court found Japanese store liable for discrimination against foreigners in violation of
the International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21,
1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195); PAUST ET. AL., supra note 9, at 43-44, 617; RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 213, RN 7 (1987) ("Multinational
enterprises have been under increasing scrutiny by international bodies"); 3 INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCEMENT 21, 104, 230 (M.C. Bassiouni ed. 1987); Jordan J. Paust, The
Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under Human Rights Law, 5 HARV. H.R. J. 51 (1992); Beth
Stephens, Human Rights Accountability: Congress, Federalism and International Law, 6 ILSA J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 277, 284-85 (2000) ("corporations can be held liable for human rights abuses
when they are responsible for violations of international human rights norms that apply to private
actors, or when they act in complicity with government officials to commit other human rights
violations."). See also In re World War H Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 114 F. Supp.
2d 939 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (U.S. nationals' claims against Japanese corporations concerning slave
labor of former prisoners of war in violation of the 1907 Hague Convention No. IV, 36 Stat.
2277, T.S. No. 539, and thus claims concerning war crimes, had been settled by a 1951 U.S.-
Japan Treaty of Peace); Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 95 AM. J.
INT'L L. 139 (2001); MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET. AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 103-04 (1980) ("deprivations and nonfulfillment" of human rights values by
corporations); 2 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 211 n.3 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952)
("observance of fundamental human rights is not dependent upon the recognition of a specific
status"); Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, arts. 9-10, Annex to the
London Agreement (8 Aug. 1945), 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (discussing criminal groups and
424 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:417
propriety of lawsuits against companies and corporations under the ATCA
for violations of international law has been recognized in several United
States cases,29 and liability can attach directly as a private actor, as an actor
colored by a connection with a state or other public actor, or as a
participant in a joint venture or complicitous relation with another violator.
For example, in 1997 in Doe v. UNOCAL Corp.,30 it was recognized that
several human rights and other international law claims made by farmers
from Burma against a private corporation and others were viable under the
organizations); Control Council Law No. 10, art. II (1) (d) (20 Dec. 1945), reprinted in PAUST
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 151, 152 (2000) (discussing
criminal groups and organizations).
29. See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 2001 U.S. Lexis 2488 (Mar. 26, 2001) (human rights claims re: imprisonment, torture,
killing); Bodner et al. v. Banque Paribas et al., 114 F. Supp.2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1090-95 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Doe v. UNOCAL Corp.,
963 F. Supp. 880, 891-92 (C.D. Cal. 1997); National Coalition Gov't of the Union of Burma v.
UNOCAL, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 348 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (private company utilizing slave labor
may be subject to liability under the ATCA); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 251-53 (1907). See also
Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998); Nguyen da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194,
1201-02, n. 13 (9th Cir. 1975) (private adoption agencies seemed to be joint tortfeasors under the
ATCA, but there was no briefing on such and they were not joined in the complaint); Iwanowa v.
Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp.2d 424, 445 (D.N.J. 1999); Burger-Fisher v. Degussa AG, 65 F.
Supp.2d 248, 272-73 (D.N.J. 1999); Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 10834, at 6-7
(D.C. 1999); Doe v. The Gap, Inc., No. CV99-717 (D. Haw.) (settled-see CALIFORNIA
LAWYER 17 (Jan. 2000)); Kathryn L. Boyd, Collective Rights Adjudication in U.S. Courts:
Enforcing Human Rights at the Corporate Level, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1139 (1999); Richard L.
Herz, Litigating Environmental Abuses Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 545
(2000); Kevin M. McDonald, Corporate Civil Liability Under the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act for
Violations of Customary International Law During the Third Reich, 1997 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW
TRANS'L L.J. 167 (1997); Hari M. Osofsky, Environmental Human Rights Under the Alien Tort
Statute: Redress for Indigenous Victims of Multinational Corporations, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L
L. REV. 335, 347, n.37, 391-95 (1997); Kenneth C. Randall, Further Inquiries Into the Alien
Tort Statute and a Recommendation, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 473, 501-03 (1986); Beth
Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power to "Define and Punish . . .
Offenses Against the Law of Nations," 42 W&M L. REV. 447, 521-22 (2000); Stephens, supra
note 28, at 284-85.
Other ATCA cases and opinions addressing private actor duties under international law
include the following: Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1, 607); Jama v.
I.N.S., 22 F. Supp.2d 353, 362-63 (D.N.J. 1998); Doe I v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F.
Supp. at 8; Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, 1996 WL 164496 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Adra v. Clift, 195
F. Supp. 857, 864 (D. Md. 1961); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 252-53 (1907); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57,
58 (1795). See also Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 438
(1989) (Rehnquist, J.) ("The Alien Tort Statute by its terms does not distinguish among classes
of defendants, and it of course has the same effect after passage of the FSIA as before with
respect to defendants other than foreign states."); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202,
206 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., op.) ("Alien Tort Statute . . . may conceivably have been
meant to cover only private, nongovernmental acts. ); M'Grath v. Candalero, 16 F. Cas.
128 (C.D. S.C. 1794) (No. 8,810) (dictum).
30. 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
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ATCA, including claims of slave or "forced" labor, torture, violence
against women, and other human rights violations and crimes against
humanity that also occurred in complicity with Burmese military,
intelligence groups, and police.' Addressing universal jurisdiction through
the ATCA and nonimmunity of corporate actors for cruel, inhumane
treatment and slave or forced labor, the district court in Iwanowa v. Ford
Motor Co.12 added: "No logical reason exists for allowing private
31. Id. at 891-92. Later, the district court dismissed such claims, "finding no evidence
that UNOCAL 'participated in or influenced' the military's unlawful conduct,'" and no evidence
that UNOCAL conspired with the military, or that UNOCAL's conduct amounted to
"participation or cooperation in the forced labor practices" beyond mere knowledge of and
benefits from the unlawful military practices. 110 F. Supp.2d 1294, 1306-07, 1310. Compare
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 245 ("color of law" responsibility exists when a private actor acts
"together with" or "in concert with" a state or "with significant state aid"); Iwanowa v. Ford
Motor Co., 67 F. Supp.2d at 445-46, n.27 (when defendant was "in close cooperation with" or
had "worked closely with" a state).
Apparently the district court did not realize that various human rights prohibitions other
than those relating to slavery or forced labor, genocide, other crimes against humanity, or war
crimes can form the basis for private actor liability in the absence of conspiratorial state
involvement, complicity with a state actor, or "color of law," and that United States lests for
"color of law" or "state action" responsibility are not part of international law and are
inappropriate and too limiting with respect to non-state actor liability for various other human
rights violations. Compare 110 F. Supp.2d at 1304-05, 1307-08 (apparently unaware of judicial
recognitions and opinions of Attorneys General not cited therein, the Executive's Amicus brief in
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala (quoted supra note 5), and other recognitions of private actor liability
noted herein).
The district court also seemed to be unaware of the full range of complicity standards under
international law. Concerning standards regarding criminal complicity that can include both
action and inaction amounting to participation, assistance, aiding, encouragement, reinforcement,
or inducement (each with some minimally demonstrated criminal intent). See, e.g., PAUST ET
AL., supra note 9, at 39-43. However, civil liability should pertain under a lower threshold than
criminal intent, e.g., negligence or fault. See, e.g., PAUST ET AL., supra note 2, at 510-12
(addressing the Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A), 80-92 (1989) (conduct by one
actor when such involves a foreseeable "real risk" of a human rights violation by another actor
leads to an independent violation, an "associated" violation, or a form of complicitous violation
of human rights)), 517 (addressing a similar decision in Chahal v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (15 Nov. 1996)), 557, 561 (Jefferson's recognition), 565-66 (also addressing a 1994
Human Rights Committee decision), 626 (addressing Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F.
Supp.2d 62 (D.D.C. 1998) and complicity of Iran in hostage-taking). Civil liability for fault is
normal in international law. See, e.g., id. at 406-07, 410, 869, 871; RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 28, at § 601.
Clearly, if the military had acted as a defacto agent of UNOCAL, liability also could have
been based on negligence under the customary "knew or should have known" standard. See,
e.g., PAUST ET AL., supra note 2, at 17, 21, 288-90, 293, 302, 305-07, 310-11, 329, 332-34,
342 (also addressing application of the standard where persons who commit violations are under
one's effective authority or control). Concerning such a standard under international criminal
law, see, e.g., PAUST ET AL., supra note 9, at 29-30, 46-76, 99, passim.
32. 67 F. Supp.2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999). With respect to nonimmunity, the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1602 et seq., recognizes immunity
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individuals and corporations to escape liability for universally condemned
violations of international law merely because they were not acting under
color of law.""3 In 1907, an Opinion of the United States Attorney General
recognized that a private United States dredging company violated a treaty
by dredging activities diverting the Rio Grande, noted that an International
Water Boundary Commission "found . .. that the . . .Company . . .
violated the stipulations of that treaty," and recognized that injuries
included "damage to property," including injury to "riparian rights," and
"[a]s to indemnity for injuries which may have been caused to citizens of
Mexico, I am of the opinion that existing statutes provide a right of action
and a forum . . . the statutes [including the ATCA] provide a forum and a
right of action."31
merely for foreign states and foreign state entities. Id. § 1603(b). It clearly does not apply to
individuals (official or private) or to private juridic entities. See also Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at
438, quoted supra in note 28. Moreover, even when the FSIA reaches foreign state entities, the
violation of treaties exception to immunity contained in §§ 1330(a) and 1604 assures that
violations of human rights treaties are not entitled to immunity, especially since human rights law
requires access to courts and application of the right to an effective remedy.
33. Id. at 445.
34. 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 251-53 (1907). It had been recognized near the time of
formation of the ATCA that the ATCA provides both a right of action or "remedy by a civil
suit" and a forum. See I Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795). Access to courts by aliens and rights to
a remedy for violations of international law were of great importance in order to not "deny
justice" to aliens, which would constitute a violation of international law by the United States and
exacerbate relations with foreign states. An original purpose of the ATCA was to avoid a
"denial of justice" to aliens in violation of customary international law by providing them access
to our courts with respect to injuries received here or abroad at the hands of United States
nationals or others found within the U.S. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d
774, 782-83 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.), (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton)
and adding: "Under the law of nations, states are obliged to make civil courts of justice
accessible for claims of foreign subjects against individuals within the state's territory.") See
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 28 § 711, cmts. a, c, e, RN 2 (denial of access to
courts, judicial denial of human rights, and denial of remedies for injury inflicted by state actors
or private persons); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795) (Bradford, Att'y Gen.); PAUST, supra note
2, at 199, 258-61 ns.479, 481; 385 n.87; Anthony D'Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the
Founding of the Constitution, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 62, 64-65 (1988); Stephens, supra note 28, at
522.
Today, it is also well-recognized that the ATCA provides a cause of action or right to a
remedy and that the only relevant inquiry is whether suit is brought by an alien, for a tort only,
alleging a violation of international law. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847-48
(11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 830 (1996); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of
Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation), 25 F.3d 1467, 1474-75 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995); Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d
421, 424-25 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds., 488 U.S. 428 (1989); Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 777, 779-80 (Edwards, J.); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 880-
82, 884-85, 887; Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp.2d 424, 441-43 (D.N.J. 1999); Jama
v. I.N.S., 22 F. Supp.2d at 362-63; Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 179 (D. Mass.
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In addition to cases involving claims under the ATCA, lawsuits
brought against companies under other United States statutes or domestic
legal provisions have led to recognition of the applicability of relevant
human rights precepts in varied contexts."
1995); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 212 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F.
Supp. 1531, 1539-40 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 279-80 (S.D. Cal.
1986); Jaffe v. Boyles, 616 F. Supp. 1371, 1379 (W.D.N.Y. 1985) (court can fashion remedies);
26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 252-53 (1907); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795); PAUST, supra note 2, at
203, 206-08, 212, 281 ns.560-61, 282 ns.570-71. See also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp.
860, 862-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (international law provides "substantive principles" and "tort"
means wrong under or in violation of international law). But see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Repub., 726 F.2d 774, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J. concurring). Judge Bork's views were in
error, were opposed by Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren, and have not been followed. See, e.g.,
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp.2d at 442 n.20 (Bork's "highly criticized opinion,"
"reasoning is flawed"); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 238; Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp.
at 1539.
Even if the ATCA did not provide a right to a remedy, human rights treaties incorporated
through the ATCA provide rights enforceable by private parties, and human rights law requires
access to domestic courts and enforcement of the right to an effective remedy. See, e.g., PAUST,
supra note 2, at 75 n.97, 198-203, 256-72 ns.468-527, 280 n.556, 292, 362, 375-76, passim;
PAUST ET. AL., supra note 2, at 72-73, 266-68, 273, 344, 459, 726; Dubai Petroleum Co. et al.
v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 82 (Tex. 2000) ("The Covenant [ICCPR] not only guarantees foreign
citizens equal treatment in the signatorie's courts, but also guarantees them equal access to these
courts. ").
It should also be noted that the ATCA is congressional legislation that executes, implements
or incorporates by reference treaties of the United States. See, e.g., PAUST ET. AL., supra note
2, at 194; PAUST, supra note 2, at 207, 282 n.571, 371-72; Paust, Customary International Law
and Human Rights Treaties Are Law of the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 301, 327 &
n.126 (1999); Paust, Suing Karadzic, 10 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 91, 92 (1997). The ATCA
performs the very role that implementing legislation plays with respect to non-self-executing
treaties and it also provides a cause of action and a remedy. Thus, treaties that are not self-
executing for the purpose of creating a private cause of action are executed or implemented by
the ATCA. Ralk v. Lincoln County, 81 F. Supp.2d 1372, 1380 (S.D. Ga. 2000) ("because the
ICCPR is not self-executing, Ralk can advance no private right of action under the" treaty, but
"could bring a claim under the Alien Tort Claims Act for violations of the ICCPR"). But see
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp.2d at 439 n. 16 (missing this point when suggesting in
false dictum that two law of war treaties (1) do not "confer rights enforceable by private
parties," but see Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242-43; Paust, Suing Saddam: Private Remedies for War
Crimes and Hostage-Taking, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 351, 360-69 (1991), and (2) are entirely non-
self-executing-and then falsely concluding, in terse, unreasoned and unsupported dictum beyond
what plaintiff had argued or briefed, see id. at 439, that "[slince neither ...provide a private
action, they cannot provide a basis for suit under the ATCA." (even under Iwanowa's false
dictum, human rights treaties are clearly distinguishable because they provide a private action).
More generally, the ATCA expressly incorporates all treaties of the United States by reference
and it is the ATCA that provides the direct basis for a lawsuit or private action, not the treaties as
such. Further, it is not the prerogative of courts to rewrite a long-standing statute to apply
merely to some treaties but not to others.
35. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155 (1989)
("fundamental human right to privacy"); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483,
487 (1974); Novotny v. Great American Federal Savings, 584 F.2d 1235, 1248, 1254, 1261 (3d
Cir. 1978) ("human right" of equal opportunity for female employees and the 1964 Civil Rights
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Recognition of human rights responsibilities of private persons,
companies, and corporations also exists in judicial decisions outside the
United States. For example, Japanese6 and German 7 cases have
recognized such forms of private responsibility, and the European Court of
Human Rights has recognized that private "terrorist activities . . . of
individuals or groups ... are in clear disregard of human rights."3" More
recently, the British House of Lords recognized that a private corporation's
responsibilities under domestic employment law are also "[s]ubject to
observance of fundamental human rights . . . . " In 1998, the Supreme
Court of Canada also recognized that it is possible "for a non-state actor to
perpetuate human rights violations on a scale amounting to persecution"
within the reach of the Refugee Convention and, thus more generally, that
private actors can engage in human rights violations.- Previously, the
Supreme Court of Canada had also recognized that sexual harassment in
the workplace can involve a corporate violation of human rights precepts
concerning sex-based discrimination that were actionable under Canadian
human rights legislation.4  An Israeli Supreme Court Justice has also
recognized that "basic human rights are not directed only against the
Act); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 32 F.2d 490, 494 (1st Cir. 1929); In re Nazi Era Cases, 2000
U.S. Dist. Lexis No. 18148 (D.N.J. Dec. 5, 2000) (voluntary dismissal of human right and other
claims occurred because of agreement re: redress through an available fund); Continental Data
Systems, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 1986 U.S. Dist. Lexis No. 23490 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (quoting
Kewanee Oil Co.); Premier-Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754, 758 (D.
Conn. 1935); Behrens v. Illinois Central Railway Co., 192 F. 581, 582 (E.D. La. 1911) (act of
Congress reaching a private company provides "betterment of human rights"). See also Trotter
v. Jack Anderson Enterps., Inc., 818 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1987) (indirect attention to alleged
Coca-Cola plant involvement in human rights violations in Guatemala); Jacobs v. Martin Sweets
Co., Inc., 550 F.2d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 1977) ("basic civil rights of man" in the employment
arena); United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1011
(S.D.N.Y. 1915) (not "right of mankind" to contract out of all courts); Jones v. Great Southern
Fireproof Hotel Co., 86 F. 370, 375-76 (6th Cir. 1898) (liberty of contract is one of the
"inalienable rights of man"); Kyriazi v. Western Electric Co., 461 F. Supp. 894, 942 (D.N.J.
1978) (discussing sex-based discrimination claims in the employment arena).
36. See supra note 28.
37. See supra note 5.
38. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 149 (1977).
39. Johnson v. Unisys, Ltd., UKHL/13, at 37 (Mar. 22 2001) (Lord Hoffmann).
40. Pushpanathan v. Canada, 1 S.C.R. 982 (1997) also noting a related practice of
Australia. The Court recognized that private violations of human rights fell within the scope of
Article 1 F (c) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, which
deals with denial of refugee protections to persons "guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations." U.N. Charter purposes and principles include the need to
respect and observe human rights.
41. Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd., .1 S.C.R. 1252 (1989). Sex-based discrimination is a
violation of human rights law. See, e.g., U.N. Charter, arts. 1 (3), 55 (c); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 17, arts. 2 (1), 26.
Paust
authority of the state, they spread also to the mutual relations between
individuals themselves." 2
IV. CONCLUSION
From the above, it is clear that non-state actors involved in terrorism
and other violations of human rights law are vulnerable to prosecution and
civil suits in domestic fora. In particular, various international crimes and
infractions allegedly engaged in by bin Laden and his followers, including
companies and corporations under his control, can be addressed in United
States courts. Civil liability can reach private actors directly and as private
actors participating in a joint venture or complicitous conduct with other
actors or as actors colored by a connection with a state, state entity, or
other public actor.
42. Hevra Kadisha, Jerusalem Burial Company v. Kestenbaum, C.A. 294/93, 46(2) P.D.
464, 530 (S. Ct. Israel 1992) (Barak, J.).
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